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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

OPNAVINST 5710.28
N87
14 April 1993

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5710.28

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5710.23B (NOTAL)
(b) Memorandum of Agreement between DIRSSP and OSIA (NOTAL)

- Encl: (1) Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI) Description and Requirements
 (2) Special Purpose Submarines (Dry Deck Shelter) Inspection Description and Requirements
 (3) SSBN Conversion or Elimination Requirements
 (4) Baseline/Data Update Inspections
 (5) Close out Inspections

1. Purpose. To establish fleet actions necessary to implement the terms of, and ensure compliance with START conditions.

2. Background. On 31 July 1991, the United States Government signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This Treaty entails extensive verification procedures including on-site inspections and specific rules for conversion or elimination of Treaty items. Operating forces will be subject to intrusive inspections. Inspections include reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI) of operationally deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) aboard SSBNs, non-intrusive inspections of SSBN conversion or elimination facilities and non-intrusive verification that special purpose submarines do not contain SLBMS. The non-intrusive special purpose and SSBN conversion or elimination inspections will be accomplished by national technical means of verification (i.e., by satellite fly-overs). The RVOSI will occur at three Treaty declared submarine inspection sites: POSEIDON Missile Facility, Atlantic (POMFLANT), Charleston, South Carolina; Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic (SWFLANT), Kings Bay, Georgia; and Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific (SWFPAC), Bangor, Washington. Additional inspections will occur at SSBN training centers and missile assembly and production facilities. The Treaty is



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structured to allow compliance with Treaty requirements while maintaining existing safety and security practices. The stated policy of the United States Navy is to fully comply with all provisions of the Treaty while also complying with all existing Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security requirements.

3. Responsibilities. The appropriate chain of command, authorized safety and security practices, and approved operating procedures will be followed throughout all Treaty inspections.

a. Chief of Naval Operations will establish policy and guidance ensure Treaty compliance. In addition, the Navy Command Center will be responsible for passing inspection notifications as outlined in enclosure (1).

b. Operating Forces (Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs), Submarine Type Commanders (TYCOMs), Groups and Squadrons, Submarine Bases, SSBNs) will provide management of, and assure compliance with, the requirements in enclosures (1) through (3). Local commanders (normally Submarine Groups or Base Commanders) will provide logistic support for inspection teams. This support will include providing in area transportation, providing assistance in securing berthing, facilitating messing requirements, and providing Public Affairs Office (PAO) support and assistance as required. Funding will be provided by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) for those actions not funded through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). Procedures for this are listed separately in reference (b), the Memorandum of Agreement between DIRSSP and OSIA. Current copies of reference (b) will be maintained by the Commanding Officers of POMFLANT, SWFLANT, and SWFPAC.

c. Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP) is responsible for overall START Treaty implementation planning and for implementing Treaty provisions at POMFLANT, SWFLANT, SWFPAC. Commanding Officers at POMFLANT, SWFLANT and SWFPAC will provide technical expertise for START implementation. DIRSSP will also provide detailed planning and assistance to training centers in preparation for and during accomplishment of Treaty requirements.

d. Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, in coordination with Strategic Systems Programs, is responsible for conducting SSBN conversions and eliminations in consonance with the Treaty requirements in enclosure (3).

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e. Chief of Naval Education and Training through the Chief of Naval Technical Training will provide management oversight of Treaty requirement implementation at TRIDENT Training Facility (TRITRAFAC), Kings Bay, GA, TRITRAFAC, Bangor, WA, and Submarine Training Facility, Charleston, SC.

f. Chief of Naval Information (CHINFO), in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Strategic Systems Programs, is responsible for planning and conducting all public affairs activities in support of START verification. This is further addressed in reference (a).

g. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service will provide START Treaty specific counterintelligence support.



T. D. RYAN
By direction

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REENTRY VEHICLE ON-SITE INSPECTION (RVOSI) DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS

1. Description. RVOSI is an inspection to verify compliance with the START warhead attribution rules. RVOSI of SLBMs may only be done at Submarine Weapons Facility, Atlantic (SWFLANT), Submarine Weapons Facility, Pacific (SWFPAC), and POLARIS Missile Facility (POMFLANT).

a. Russia will notify the United States at least 16 hours in advance of the arrival of their inspection party at the point of entry (Dulles International Airport or Travis AFB). This first notification will inform the U.S. of an impending inspection, but will not state the type of inspection nor the facility to be inspected. This notification will be known as a stage 1 alert. The Navy Command Center will notify all appropriate commands of the receipt of a stage 1 alert. Upon arrival at the point of entry the inspectors will specify a facility and the type of inspection to be conducted. This will be the stage 2 alert. The Navy Command Center will first alert the facility to be inspected and then inform the stage 1 recipients that they will not be inspected. The stage 1 alert will serve as a "heads up" that the inspectors may be coming, while the stage 2 alert will serve to institute pre-inspection restrictions (see below). Upon arrival at the base, the inspectors will be provided with a simplified map of the waterfront area, which depicts the presence of all SSBNs within 5 km of the base. The inspection team leader will then designate which SSBN and which tube they desire to inspect. The inspectors may select from any SSBN present within 5 km of the submarine base, with units in drydock being exempted.

b. The inspectors will be accompanied by official United States Government in-country escorts provided by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). They will be joined by escorts provided by the Commanding Officer of the inspected facility. Preparation of the SSBN launch tube, and SLBM contained within, will not begin until the inspectors arrival in the vicinity (i.e., within visual range) of the SSBN designated for inspection. This preparation will involve moving the SSBN to the missile handling facility, removing the tube closure and missile nose fairing, and installing a specially designed cover over the reentry vehicles. The cover will allow verification that no more than the attributed number of reentry vehicles are present, while preventing the inspectors access to the physical dimensions

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and characteristics of the reentry vehicles. The preparation and inspection will occur at missile handling facilities at the three inspection sites (Wharf Alpha at POMFLANT, Explosive Handling Wharf at SWFLANT and SWFPAC). These missile handling evolutions are cooperative efforts between the SSBN, Squadron and Missile Assembly Facility personnel. SSBN and Facility Dockside Standard Operating Procedures will be used.

c. The possibility of delay in SSBN underway times for sea trials or patrol and disruption of schedules is an acknowledged consequence of the Treaty. Local commands should delineate, in local instructions, procedures for notification of higher authority should delays to underway operations be anticipated.

d. Major maintenance on the selected ship may cause significant delays before the ship can be moved to the inspection site. Should this occur, local commands should interface with their chain of command to facilitate the completion of interfering work.

2. Requirements. Restrictions as a result of these requirements do not apply to work necessary to deal with an emergency involving a launcher, missile, or submarine.

a. Pre-Inspection restrictions. No later than 1 hour after the inspectors specify that a particular base will have a RVOSI (the stage 2 alert), the following restrictions shall apply to the specified base, and all SSBNs present:

(1) No movement of any SSBN farther than 5 km from the boundary of the inspection site, or commencement of drydocking of any SSBN is permitted.

(2) SSBN missile muzzle hatches that are closed shall not be opened.

(3) On SSBN tubes that have open missile muzzle hatches, work shall not begin to remove the missile or any reentry vehicles. If the Service Unit or liner has been landed on the SSBN, such work has already begun and may proceed. This work shall be expeditiously completed or terminated at the most logical point in the procedure as approved by the Commanding Officers of POMFLANT, SWFLANT, or SWFPAC. The fact that it may be several hours before the inspectors arrive at the inspection site should be considered in terminating this work. The missile muzzle hatch may be shut as convenient to relax security requirements or to prepare to move the SSBN.

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(4) These restrictions remain in effect until the inspectors have designated the specific SSBN upon which they wish to conduct the RVOSI and until they have arrived in the vicinity of the SSBN. The designated SSBN shall not be moved until the inspectors arrive within visual range. The inspectors may not designate a SSBN in drydock.

b. Conduct of Inspection

(1) Standard Operating Procedures shall be used.

(2) The inspection shall be conducted at the Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW) at SWFLANT and SWFPAC, and at Wharf Alpha at POMFLANT.

(3) Safety and security briefings for the inspectors shall be completed within 1 hour of inspection team arrival at the base. The in-country escort will use a map to show the Russian team leader the location and type of each SSBN at the base (within 5 km of the site boundary) and the type of SLBM for each SSBN. This map, known as an annotated site diagram, shall limit the information given to the inspectors to only that required by the Treaty (the 5 km pre-inspection restriction zone, the coastline, the location of each SSBN and the number and type of launchers on each SSBN). These briefings and map preparation will be the responsibility of the Commanding Officers of POMFLANT, SWFLANT or SWFPAC. Representatives of the responsible Submarine Squadron Commander, Base Commanding Officer, and Missile Facility Commanding Officer may attend these in-briefings.

(4) Using the annotated site diagram, the inspectors will designate which SSBN and launcher aboard that SSBN they desire to inspect. If the selected SSBN contains no missiles, the inspectors will be so informed by the in-country escort. The inspectors may select another SSBN. If the inspectors select a SSBN that contains missiles, but the specific tube they select does not contain a missile, the inspectors will be informed by the in-country escort. The inspectors may select another tube on the selected SSBN. If any of the above situations arise, the inspectors have the right to inspect one launcher tube declared not to contain a missile in addition to normal inspection rights. A launcher tube which contains a missile without reentry vehicles is considered to contain an accountable missile, and the inspection may proceed. The fact that a missile has a reduced number or no reentry vehicles is irrelevant to the inspection. The actual number of reentry vehicles on a missile shall not be divulged.

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(5) If a special purpose submarine, as defined in the Treaty (see enclosure (2)), is making a port visit at the RVOSI site, the special purpose submarine shall not be subject to the RVOSI. The inspectors shall be so informed if they select the special purpose submarine.

(6) The inspectors shall be transported to the location of the SSBN within 3 hours after they designate the missile tube to be inspected. The Commanding Officers of POMFLANT, SWFLANT, or SWFPAC is responsible for transporting the inspectors and escorts while on-site. If the SSBN must be moved, provisions shall first be made for the inspectors to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the designated SSBN. If the SSBN is already positioned at the Explosive Handling Wharf, the Navy must be prepared to allow not less than two members of the inspection team to observe the SSBN until the inspection starts. This is to ensure that nothing is off-loaded from the designated SSBN. These members must be afforded a clear, unobstructed view of the upper tube edge, and must also be within 50 meters of the designated launcher tube. In cases where a clear and unobstructed view cannot be achieved within a 50 meter distance, the Russian team leader and the escort team leader may agree to a position that permits a clear view from greater than 50 meters. The Russian team will not be allowed on board tenders. It is desired that the inspectors be limited to shore areas only when observing SSBN movement.

(7) The designated SSBN missile muzzle hatch shall not be opened until requested by the in-country escort.

(8) The inspectors shall be allowed to observe the preparations for inspection from the pier adjacent to the SSBN at a distance of no greater than 50 meters from the missile tube. This is to verify that reentry vehicles are not removed. In cases where a clear and unobstructed view cannot be achieved within a 50 meter distance, the Treaty contains provisions for agreements between the inspection team leader and the in-country escort for greater distances. OSIA will negotiate any such adjustments.

(9) Missile inspection preparation and conduct shall be performed by POMFLANT, SWFLANT, or SWFPAC personnel, in cooperation with SSBN, TRF/Tender, and Squadron personnel.

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(10) The inspectors shall be allowed topside aboard the SSBN and in the Service Unit to conduct the inspection. The inspectors shall not be allowed aboard tenders or below decks on SSBNS.

c. In-country escort. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and POMFLANT, SWFLANT, and SWFPAC personnel will escort the inspectors, and be the official coordinators between United States and Russian personnel. All questions from or to the inspectors will be handled through the in-country escorts. United States Navy site personnel are not bound to follow orders from OSIA, however, reasonable efforts should be made to resolve disputes and problem areas.

d. Security

(1) Lists of inspectors and escorts will be provided and entry/authorization procedures shall be used.

(2) Counterintelligence considerations shall be part of local plans. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service will provide START Treaty specific counterintelligence support.

e. Public Affairs Guidance. Public Affairs Officer (PAO) functions shall be performed by the local area coordinator's PAO or local base PAO, depending upon availability. Public Affairs matters shall be governed by applicable Chief of Information (CHINFO) instructions.

f. Reports. No routine reports are required by operating forces, OSIA will prepare the official report of the inspection. Commands are to exercise their discretion, and use existing reporting structures to report extraordinary events or adverse occurrences.

**SPECIAL PURPOSE (DRY DECK SHELTER) SUBMARINE INSPECTION
DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS**

1. Description. Under the terms of the START Treaty no more than two ballistic missile submarines may be modified for use as special purpose submarines. These submarines will not be subject to Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI). There are no intrusive (involving Russian inspectors presence on-site) inspections of these submarines, but certain restrictions and non-intrusive inspections apply. START refers to these ships as "special purpose submarines." For ease of reference, they will be referred to in this enclosure as Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) submarines.

2. Requirements

a. Basing. The DDS submarines shall not be permanently based at Kings Bay, Georgia; Bangor, Washington; or the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, South Carolina. The Russians will be notified of their permanent base. If a DDS submarine happens to be making a port visit to one of the above three bases when Russia declare a RVOSI at that base, the DDS submarine shall not be subject to the RVOSI.

b. Cooperative Displays (Inspections). Up to twice a year per DDS submarine, Russia may request that the missile muzzle hatches on the DDS submarine be opened to demonstrate that the submarine launcher tubes do not contain missiles. National technical means of verification (i.e., satellites) will be used by Russia to observe these open hatches. This display will only occur at the permanent homeports of the DDS submarines (currently Norfolk and Pearl Harbor).

(1) After receipt of a request for the display of DDS submarines in their permanent base, the DDS submarines at that base shall not leave port until the display is complete.

(2) If both DDS submarines are located in the same base when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed. This dual display will count as only one request.

(3) Within 24 hours of the request, the decks of the DDS submarine shall be cleared, and all missile muzzle hatches shall be opened for a period of not less than 12 hours.

(4) If the DDS submarines are absent from port when the request is received Russia will be notified. In this case the Russians retain their quota.

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(5) DIRSSP will notify Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT) and/or Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) by telephone/voice of a Russian request for DDS submarine verification. OSIA will initiate FLASH Message traffic with the notification information.

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SSBN CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS

1. Description. SSBN conversion or elimination is not subject to verification by intrusive (involving a Russian presence on-site) inspections.

2. Requirements

a. All missiles shall be removed from the SSBN prior to commencing conversion or elimination procedures.

b. Elimination

(1) The elimination process is initiated when the SSBN is positioned at the elimination facility with missile launch tubes empty and missile muzzle hatches opened or removed. A formal notification of this will be made to Russia by DIRSSP via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). This notification starts the elimination time-line clock.

(2) Accountability of the SLBM launchers continues until all missile muzzle hatches and associated superstructure fairing are removed. This includes the entire superstructure fairing over the length of the missile tube section. DIRSSP will make a formal notification via the NRRC to Russia when the SSBN is no longer accountable.

(3) DIRSSP coordinates with Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYS COM) for SLBM launcher elimination. For START Treaty purposes U.S. SLBM launchers will be eliminated by complete removal of the missile compartment. The SSBN elimination must be complete within 270 days of initiation. DIRSSP will make a formal notification via the NRRC to Russia of the completion of elimination.

(4) The SSBN shall remain visible (i.e., outside and uncovered) during the entire elimination process.

c. Conversion. Only notifications to the Russians will be required.

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BASELINE/DATA UPDATE INSPECTIONS

1. Description. Baseline and subsequent Data Update inspections will be conducted at all facilities declared in the Treaty. Affected facilities are POMFLANT, SWFLANT, SWFPAC, TRIDENT Training Facility (TRITRAFAC) Kings Bay, and TRITRAFAC Bangor.

a. Only one Baseline inspection per facility will take place. The purpose will be to confirm the number of first stage missile motors at each facility as compared to those numbers reported in the Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Training facilities will be inspected to ensure that no first stage missile motors exist at those facilities.

b. Data Update inspections will be conducted routinely, but are limited to no more than two per facility per year. Their purpose is to verify changes to the MOU which occur due to operations and movements.

2. Requirements. Requirements for these inspections will be similar to those for all other inspections. Pre-inspection restrictions will apply to the approved Treaty site diagram. The inspectors will be allowed to verify the numbers of Treaty accountable items (first stage motors) at each site. Training facilities must be prepared to demonstrate that no Treaty accountable items exist on their premises.

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CLOSE OUT INSPECTIONS

1. Description. A close out inspection will be conducted at all facilities declared in the Treaty after all Treaty accountable items have been removed. Affected facilities will be POMFLANT, SWFLANT, SWFPAC, TRITRAFAC Kings Bay, TRITRAFAC Bangor, and China Lake, CA.¹ Only one close-out per facility will take place. The purpose will be to confirm that no first stage missile motors are located at the facility.

2. Requirements. Requirements for these inspections will be similar to those for all other inspections. The inspectors will be allowed to verify that no Treaty accountable items (first stage motors) are located at each site. DIRSSP is responsible for coordinating all notifications and planning associated with facility close out inspections.

¹ NGMS Dam Neck, and Submarine Training Facility (SUBTRAFAC), Charleston will receive a close out inspection during the 120 day baseline inspection period after Treaty Entry Into Force.